[Vol. 107: 2509 of waivers of deportation under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 7 for aliens convicted of certain criminal offenses 8 applies retroactively. 9 Prior to 1996, aliens found deportable could apply for relief pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA, under which immigration judges took into account a variety of favorable elements in determining whether to grant a waiver of deportation.' 0 The retroactive elimination of section 212(c) relief would not only ensnare aliens convicted of minor crimes," but it would also negate their ties to, and accomplishments in, the United States. 2 Moreover, while the jurisdictional provisions of the AEDPA target criminal aliens, numerous provisions of the IIRIRA apply to noncriminal aliens. Several district courts have already found that the ITRIRA narrows judicial review of the INS's denial of a noncriminal alien's attempt to stay deportation pending a motion to reconsider his deportation order.' 3 In addition, the IIRIRA seeks to eliminate judicial review over all denials of discretionary relief except asylum, 4 14. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
continuous physical presence in the United States, his good moral character, and the degree of hardship that would result from deportation. ' As an initial matter, courts have addressed whether the acts eliminate all statutory jurisdiction over final orders of deportation. In the first wave of cases, courts of appeals unanimously held that the AEDPA eliminated their jurisdiction to review deportation orders directly under the preexisting petitionfor-review scheme established by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961.6 Several courts emphasized that the AEDPA did not raise a constitutional issue because other avenues of review remained available, 7 while other courts did not address the constitutional issues raised by the Act.' 8 Subsequently, numerous legal permanent residents sought judicial review of their deportation orders by filing habeas actions in federal district courts.' 9 The district courts have adopted a two-step inquiry. First, they determine whether, as a matter of statutory construction, the acts eliminated or narrowed the scope of review under the general habeas statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.20 19. Although most challenges to deportation orders were brought directly before the courts of appeals after Congress established the petition-for-review scheme in 1961, see supra note 16. aliens could still seek review in district court under the general habeas statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Orozco v. INS. 911 F.2d 539, 541 (11th Cir. 1990 ) ("Challenges to deportation proceedings are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241."). But see Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d 1248. 1251 (8th Cir. 1981) (limiting habeas corpus to review the "denial of discretionary relief where deportability itself is not an issue").
20. Section 2241 is the general grant of habeas jurisdiction to federal courts and provides jurisdiction to consider petitions claiming that an individual is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). or -'in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States," id. § 2241(c)(1).
If so, they then determine whether the acts violate the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that " [t] he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 21 Virtually all courts have held that they retain habeas jurisdiction under the general habeas statute, 22 but have disagreed as to whether the acts altered the scope of review.' Courts that have construed the AEDPA and the IIRIRA as narrowing their jurisdiction under § 2241 have nonetheless upheld the acts on the ground that they "preserve[] the balance between the Suspension Clause and Congress's plenary authority to control immigration. 2 4 For example, in Mbiya v. INS, 25 the district court defined the scope of review of deportation orders required by the Constitution by balancing the requirements of the Suspension Clause and Congress's plenary authority to control immigration. 26 The Mbiya court adopted this balancing test, however; without providing either a satisfactory explanation for or a discussion of the writ, other than as a generic limitation on Congress's otherwise plenary power over immigration. First, the court relied on a statement by the Supreme Court in Heikkila v. Barber 27 for the proposition that habeas review of deportation orders "'has always been limited to the enforcement of due process requirements.""' 2 The Mbiya court, however; misunderstood the Court's statement in Heikkila, 2 9 and indeed, the case law belies the notion that habeas has ever been limited to enforcing Fifth Amendment due process requirements in the deportation context. 3 The court then applied a balancing test similar to that used in Mathews v. Eldridge 3 l to determine the scope of the constitutional writ. 2 Weighing the private interest (an individual's right to habeas corpus) against the government interest (Congress's plenary power over immigration), it determined that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard should apply to habeas decisions in immigration. 33 The Mbiya court, however failed not only to include the third element of the Mathews balancing test, the risk of erroneous decision and probable value of additional procedural safeguards,' but also to explain why the Suspension Clause should be collapsed into a balancing test in which the dominant component is the judicially created plenary power doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Yang v. INS" exemplifies a second approach taken by courts reviewing the acts. The court relied on past Supreme Court deportation cases to assert, in dictum, that the Suspension Clause does not encompass review of discretionary decisions or errors of law in deportation proceedings. 36 The Yang court's use of these cases, however, is both questionable and misleading. 3 Because the case was before the court on a petition for review, there was no need to reach the issue of the scope of habeas revie, Instead, the court could hae done %%hat ever), other court of appeals had done: dismiss for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the scope of habeas rev iew. for constitutional claims, but also for legal error, 38 abuses of discretion, 3 and factual findings not supported by any evidence. n Although the Supreme Court has recognized Congress's plenary power over substantive immigration decisions, at it has maintained that this power is "subject to judicial intervention under the 'paramount law of the Constitution' ' 42 and that it therefore does not trump the requirements of the Suspension Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, 3 or the constitutionally mandated separation of powers." Thus, despite past efforts by Congress to confer "finality" over administrative deportation orders," habeas corpus has always been available to aliens to test the legality of those orders before an Article 1I court. Determining the full scope of review guaranteed by the Suspension Clause may at first seem a difficult task. 47 In part, this is because the existence of statutory habeas jurisdiction for claims of federal prisoners since the Judiciary Act of 1789,48 the direct ancestor of § 2241, has obviated the need for the Supreme Court to engage in a sustained analysis of the constitutional writ. As a result of this difficulty, this Note returns to first principles to examine the availability and scope of judicial review guaranteed by the Suspension Clause to aliens facing deportation. Based on the Court's limited Suspension Clause jurisprudence and the history of the common law writ, it concludes that the constitutional writ not only applies to aliens facing deportation, 9 but also supports a broad scope of review over deportation orders, encompassing both constitutional and nonconstitutional claims.
Part I examines the Supreme Court's view of the relationship between the common law writ of habeas corpus and the Suspension Clause. It also discusses the Court's understanding of the purported common law rule that the writ serves only to test the jurisdiction of the committing court, ° and the faced with the illegal exclusion of an alien, "something must be done, and it naturally falls to be done by the courts"); The Supreme Court has afforded aliens facing deportation---even illegal immigrants--greater constitutional protection than those facing exclusion. Compare The Japanese Immigrant Case. 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903) (stating that the "fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law'" cannot be disregarded in deportation proceedings), with Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concered.") Among aliens facing deportation, the greatest protection has been given to legal permanent residents, the targets of the judicial review provisions of the 1996 acts under discussion here. While legal permanent residents facing deportation thus have the strongest claim to a broad scope of judicial review, this Note does not distinguish between legal permanent residents and illegal immigrants in terms of the scope of review required by the Suspension Clause. 53 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall unequivocally declared that "for the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably be had to the common law." ' Similarly, in more recent cases expanding the range of claims the Court's review was not limited to jurisdictional claims).
51. Cf. Frank, 237 U.S. at 330-31 (noting that "bare legal review .. seems to have been the limit of judicial authority [on habeas review] under the common-law practice"); id. (contrasting that with the more modem practice, as expanded by statute, in which the petitioner testifies as to "the truth of the matter respecting the causes of his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to dispose of the party as law and justice require" (internal quotation omitted)). At common law, "no one can in any Case controvert the Truth of the [facts of the] Return to Habeas Corpus, or plead or suggest any Matter repugnant to it." 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113 (Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1978) (1721). When a court issued a writ of habeas corpus, the person having custody of the detainee was required to produce before the reviewing court the cause of commitment and, depending on the circumstances, the body itself. The production of the cause of commitment, along with the body in appropriate cases, by the person having custody of the detainee-normally the jailer-was known as "the return. " In Bollman, Marshall also suggested that the writ's existence was wholly a function of statute and that federal courts possessed no common law authority to issue the writ. See 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93. To avoid the implication of a de facto suspension of the writ through nonauthorization, however, Marshall said that the habeas jurisdiction provided by section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 demonstrated that Congress "must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity." Id. at 95.
The Court has not spoken directly on whether Congress may eliminate all habeas jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause. The issue has provoked a lively and wide-ranging debate among scholars. Compare, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 43 n.5 (2d ed. 1988) ("Absent congressional authorization, federal courts even lack power to issue writs of habeas corpus."), with Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 607 (arguing that congressional cognizable on habeas, the Court has looked to the writ's use at common law. 55 Thus, although its view of habeas has evolved over time, the Supreme Court has never wavered from the proposition that the Suspension Clause incorporates the common law writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789. 56 The Court has consistently paid homage to the importance and value of habeas corpus historically; 57 nevertheless, it has generally articulated a narrow view of the writ's scope at common law. Throughout most of the nation's history, the Court has adhered to the purported common law rules that the truth of a return to a writ of habeas corpus could not be controverted" 8 and that the writ served only to test the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 59 In essence, therefore, the Court believed that at common law habeas corpus was not a means by which to challenge criminal convictions. 6°I n the early 1960s, however, the Court's expansive interpretation of habeas statutes sparked a revision of its view regarding the writ's scope at common authorization is not essential because the "Constitution's habeas corpus clause is a directive to all superior courts of record, state as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available"). In fact, the Court has suggested that, at least in the criminal context, the Suspension Clause may protect a more expansive form of the writ than that which existed in 1789. through statutory enactment and judicial elaboration of common law principles. See. e.g., Pressley. 430 U.S. at 380 n.13 (suggesting indirectly that Congress may not be able to "totally repeal all post-18th century developments in this area of the law," but declining to address the issue); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court could not be "imprisoned by every particular of habeas corpus as it existed in the late 18th and 19th centuries"); Developments in the Last-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1269 (1970) ("While the framers probably could not have foreseen the extent to which the writ's function would expand, the history of two centuries of expansion through a combination of statutory and judicial innovation in England must have led them to understand habeas corpus as an inherently elastic concept not bound to its 1789 form." (footnote omitted)); see also Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2239-40 (1996) (assuming. arguendo. that the Suspension Clause refers to the writ as it exists today, rather than to the more limited form of the writ that existed in 1789).
57. 70 In an important and influential article written three years after Fay v. Noia was decided, Dallin Oaks argued that the common law writ provided neither de novo review of the factual findings of a superior court of record, nor a means of redressing every kind of "intolerable restraint" or "violation of fundamental law. ' 71 Oaks underscored that the passage from Bushell's Case from which Justice Brennan derived his "fundamental law" test did not concern the scope of habeas review, but rather whether the Court of Common Pleas had the power to issue the writ on behalf of a person imprisoned by another court where there was no issue of privilege, 72 which would have meant that the petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. addition, Oaks challenged Justice Brennan's assertion that at common law "due process" implied "supervisory review of the acts of judges of superior courts, or a broad license to 'remedy any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law."' 74 Finally, Oaks pointed to Vaughan's own assertion that the broad power to review the sufficiency of the return applied only to persons committed for contempt, not to those committed for treason or felony."5 Similarly, the post-Warren Court's shift to a narrower interpretation of statutory habeas was accompanied by a movement away from Fay's expansive conception of the common law writ1 6 and a return to the Court's earlier position that at common law the writ was not a means by which to challenge criminal convictions. Justice Brennan's view of the common law writ was explicitly rejected by three Justices in Schneckloth i. Bustanonte,' 7 while the Court's actual holding in Fay v. Noia has been substantially overruled by a series of decisions.
7
Criticism of Fay v. Noia was not premised on the authority it bestowed on the common law writ as an interpretive device, but rather on its actual interpretation of the common law writ in the criminal context. Courts interpreting the 1996 acts have, nonetheless, posited the same narrow conception of common law writ habeas in noncriminal deportation cases. [Ulpon a general commitment for treason or felony, the pnsoner (the cause appeanng) may press for his tryal .... and upon his indictment and tryal, the particular cause of his imprisonment must appear, which proving no treason or felony. the pnsoner shall have the benefit of it. But in this case [involving contempt], though the evidence given were no full nor manifest evidence against the persons indicted, but such as the jury upon it ought to have acquitted those indicted, the prisoner shall never have any benefit of it. but must continue in prison, when remanded, until he hath paid that fine unjustly impos'd on him, which was the whole end of his imprisonment. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 (C.P. 1670).
76. The last Supreme Court case to describe a broad scope for common lawv habeas was decided in 1969, the same year Chief Justice Warren retired from the Court. See Hams v. Nelson. 394 U-S 286. 292 (1969) (stating that the "power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary"). For a narrower view of the scope of the common law writ, see, for example. Swam %. Pressley. 430 U S 372. 385 (1977) (Burger. C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), which asserted that "ait common law, the writ was available to (1) compel adherence to prescribed procedures in advance of tral; (2) to inquire into the cause of commitment not pursuant to judicial process; and (3) to inquire whether a committing court had proper jurisdiction"; and Does the history of the Great Writ, the "highest remedy in law, for any man that is imprisoned,"" 0 really offer such a limited scope of judicial review? A searching analysis of the writ's history reveals a more complex story."' The "black-letter" rule against controverting the return was not a hardand-fast rule in all criminal cases, and it did not take into account the broad scope of review exercised in noncriminal matters, instances of executive detention, or summary convictions. Even Oaks, a severe critic of the Supreme Court's use of habeas's history to justify federal post-conviction review of state court decisions, has recognized the writ's frequent use and the broad scope of review it provided at common law to challenge noncriminal confinement. 82 As Part H demonstrates, the scope of common law habeas review of noncriminal confinement was indeed a different matter altogether. If, as the Court has maintained, constitutional habeas must be defined by referring to the writ at common law, Congress, however plenary its power over immigration, cannot gut the writ of its common law core without violating the Suspension Clause. 3
II. THE AVAILABILITY AND SCOPE OF HABEAS REVIEW AT COMMON LAW
This part first discusses the origins of the writ of habeas corpus.' It then examines the writ's applicability to noncriminal cases in general and to aliens in particular. Next, it identifies the five factors that triggered a broad scope of review on habeas and the actual scope of review exercised at common law. 8 " "extraordinary case," in which a constitutional violation is coupled with factual innocence, a court may grant habeas relief absent a showing of "cause" for the petitioner's procedural default).
80 Supp. 1997 ) (arguing that the form of the writ used to challenge executive detention, as opposed to the form used to challenge the detention of convicted criminal offenders, was likely foremost in the minds of the Framers when they drafted the Suspension Clause).
84. Unless otherwise indicated, this Note refers to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. The King's Bench developed this form of the writ in the 16th century, "chiefly to protect subjects against unconstitutional imprisonment by privy councillors and officers of state." J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 126 (2d ed. 1979). By the late 17th century, particularly after the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the writ ad subjiciendum became the primary safeguard against all illegal detention. See 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 117-18 (2d ed. 1938). While the Act's protections applied only to criminal matters, the common law form of the writ ad subjiciendum was used to challenge noncriminal confinement. See id. at 119; ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 82-83 (1960) .
85. For the sake of clarity, this Note uses the terms "at common law," "common law history." and "common law habeas" to refer to the writ generally-that is, to English cases decided under both the
A. Origins of Habeas Corpus
Prior to the sixteenth century, habeas corpus was used primarily by the central courts of the Crown to check the jurisdiction of local courts. 8 6 Habeas corpus enabled the central courts to bring parties to proceedings in inferior courts before the common law courts, or to release a litigant in one of the central courts who had been arrested by the process of an inferior court." Habeas therefore provided a common remedy against the misuse of jurisdiction by borough courts; 88 it also provided a powerful means by which common law courts could expand their jurisdiction at the expense of local courts. 9 While this early use of habeas to defeat proceedings in inferior courts was certainly abused, 9° it nonetheless suggests the writ's most fundamental attribute: testing the legality of the cause of commitment.
9 '
Starting in the sixteenth century, habeas corpus was used to challenge the validity of imprisonments by rival central courts, such as the Court of Requests, 92 the Court of Admiralty, 93 and the Court of High Commission.' In part, this reflected Chief Justice Coke's struggle to transfer the supervision of both inferior courts and these quasi-judicial conciliar authorities-the supervision of which was traditionally a royal prerogative-to the King's Bench. 95 Coke's belief in the supremacy of the common law and the superiority of the common law courts to all the other English courts eventually various habeas corpus acts and the common law form of the writ. In contrast. "statutory habeas" refers to cases decided solely under those acts, whereas "common law wnt" refers solely to the nonstatutory, common law form of the writ. 1651, 1674 (1994) (noting that Coke fought "stubbornly to limit the king's prerogative powers and to subject them to the common law and to parliamentary control").
prevailed, 96 even though Coke-despite his reputation as the greatest lawyer of his day-was dismissed from the King's Bench in 1616 after refusing to state that he would stay a suit on the King's order. 97 This struggle had an important effect on the development of habeas corpus. While the writ was ostensibly limited to ensuring that the committing court had jurisdiction, it in fact ensured that power was exercised in conformity with controlling statutes and the common law.
98 Moreover, as one scholar has noted, in the battle of superior courts "with these partially judicial, partially executive bodies, the writ moved yet closer to its role as a safeguard against the arbitrary power of the Crown itself." 99 Though initially used to challenge prerogative acts by councillors and conciliar courts,"° the writ, somewhat ironically, would later be associated with the King's effort to provide justice to any subject deprived of his liberty.'°'
B. Availability of Habeas Corpus To Challenge Noncriminal Confinement and Its Applicability to Aliens
Despite the long association between habeas corpus and criminal confinement,'1 2 the writ was available at common law to challenge a broad range of noncriminal confinement, both public and private. 3 it was in the nature of habeas corpus as a prerogative writ that the "King ought to have an account why any of his subjects are imprisoned").
102. In part, the link between habeas and criminal confinement is due to the celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.), which had a profound influence in America. See Paschal, supra note 54, at 622 ("The prestige of the 1679 Act was so high that several states enacted almost word-for-word copies and others almost certainly regarded it as part of their common law.").
103. to a husband's unlawful detention of his wife); BAKER, supra note 84, at 127 (observing that the writ was not confined to those facing criminal charges); 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 84, at 119 (noting the increasing use of habeas to gain relief from private and noncriminal confinement starting in the late 17th century); Cohen, sipra note 72, at 196 (noting that the original purpose of the writ was to challenge civil imprisonments).
104. See Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, 56 Geo. 3, ch. 100 (Eng.). The 1816 Act also abolished the rule against controverting the return in noncriminal matters, see id. § § 3-4, except for those "imprisoned for Debt or by process in any civil Suit," id. § 1. It has been suggested that those committed for criminal matters also had recourse to the common law writ. recourse to the common law writ.' 0 5 Indeed, the common law writ had been used to test the legality of noncriminal custody since at least the early seventeenth century,'0 6 and courts issued writs of habeas corpus in an array of noncriminal contexts.' 0 7 Moreover, in practice judges applied many of the procedural protections'" established for criminal cases by the celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 1679'0 9 to noncriminal matters."
Although no exact analog to present immigration procedures existed at the time, it is clear that aliens could seek review of their confinement through the common law writ of habeas corpus:
In any matter involving the liberty of the subject the action of the Crown or its ministers or officials is subject to the supervision and control of the judges on habeas corpus. The judges owe a duty to safeguard the liberty of the subject not only to the subjects of the Crown, but also to all persons within the realm who are under the 108. See 9 HOLDSWORrH, supra note 84, at 118 (stating that the Act made the writ the "most effective weapon yet devised for the protection of the liberty of the subject"). These protections required. inter alia. a return to the writ within a specified time, delivery by jailers to prisoners of a true copy of the warrant of commitment, and either a trial for treason or felony at the next sessions or bail. wtth an extension for only one term allowed to the Crown. See id.; see also SHARPE., supra note 86, at 19 (stating that the 1679 Act was "largely a piecemeal repairing of the common law").
109. 31 Car. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.). 110. For example, even though they were not required to do so by the 1679 Act, judges generally issued the writ when not in session and made the writ returnable immediately in noncriminal matters. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 84, at 121.
111. 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 25 (3d ed. 1955) (footnotes omitted). Simtlarly. Blackstone described the writ as "efficacious... in all manner of illegal confinement," 3 BLACKTONE. supra note 94, at *131 (emphasis added), while Coke said habeas extended to all detention "contra legem terrae. 112. See 9 HOLDswORTH, supra note 84, at 94-97. In England. aliens can still challenge their deportation orders through habeas corpus. See BAKER, supra note 84. at 127-28 (observing that the chief use of habeas in 20th-century England is to question orders of extradition and deportatton).
Thus, slaves gained release through the Great Writ," 3 while other nonEnglishmen also gained review via habeas corpus of alleged deprivations of liberty.
14 Aliens in the United States have likewise been able to challenge their confinement through habeas corpus since the nation's founding." 5
C. Elements Triggering a Broad Scope of Review on Habeas Corpus
In challenging noncriminal confinement, as well as summary criminal convictions, the common law writ of habeas corpus was not limited simply to "jurisdictional" issues, but encompassed legal error, abuses of discretion, and, at times, factual findings. Indeed, the meaning of "jurisdiction" varied at common law, depending on the context. Although jurisdictional error was extremely narrow when it involved collateral review of a superior court judgment, the concept might have meant something "close[] to full review of the merits" when it involved review of an inferior court judgment."1 6 While there was no precise formula, the writ's scope was always broadest where the commitment involved one or more of the following five elements: (1) a threat to the subject's fundamental liberty; (2) the exercise of executive power; (3) a judgment by an inferior court; (4) no safeguard of jury trial; and (5) the lack of any other available remedy. I will discuss each in turn. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759) (reviewing, but denying, the habeas petition of a neutral alien deemed a prisoner of war because he was captured aboard an enemy French privateer).
Moreover, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, though limited to criminal matters, protected all inhabitants of England, including nonenemy aliens, from being sent abroad as prisoners without their consent. The Act provided that no inhabitant of England could be sent as a prisoner abroad, see 31 Car. 2, ch. 2, § 12, except persons contracting, or convicts requesting, to be transported, and those having committed a capital offense in the place to which they were to be sent, see id. § § 13, 14, 16. In fact, fear of being imprisoned overseas was a driving force behind the 1679 Act. See Cohen, supra note 72, at 186.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Villato, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 370, 373 (1797) (granting a habeas petition and ordering the release of a Spanish citizen accused of high treason). The fact that federal courts were statutorily authorized to review state custody of aliens 25 years prior to gaining habeas jurisdiction over citizens in state custody further demonstrates the unique and important role federal courts have played In reviewing habeas petitions of aliens. Compare Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539-40 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (1994)) (authorizing federal habeas review in cases involving "subjects or citizens of a foreign State"), with Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)) (authorizing federal habeas review in cases of all persons restrained of their liberty "in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States").
116. Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 575, 589 (1993); see also SHARPE, supra note 86, at 25-26 (discussing the broad scope of jurisdictional review of summary convictions).
Threat to Fundamental Liberty
In noncriminal matters, common law courts were inclined to exercise a broad scope of review where the confinement presented a threat to the fundamental liberty of an individual. The broad construction given to a "fundamental liberty interest" is demonstrated by the range of claims cognizable on habeas at common law." 7 As a prerogative writ, habeas corpus required an explanation for any deprivation of an individual's liberty." 8 Courts thus recognized that liberty could be endangered not only by the state, but by private actors as well." 9
Exercise of Executive Power
Executive detention implicated the core function of the writ of habeas corpus, and the writ entered its most important phase when it began to be used to challenge executive commitments in the late sixteenth century.' 20 1676) (reviewing factual findings on an application by a wife to determine whether her husband's "ill usage" and "imprisonment" of her was lawful, but refusing to release the wife).
120. See DUKER, supra note 99, at 40-48; see also Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1298 (1996) (stating that the common law writ's "most basic purpose [was] avoiding serious abuses of power by a government, say a king's imprisonment of an individual, without referring the matter to a court" (emphasis added)); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 385 (1977) (Burger. CJ.. concumng) (noting that at common law and at the time of the Framers, the writ was used "to inquire into the cause of commitment not pursuant to judicial process").
121. 74 Eng. Rep. 65 (C.P. 1587) (discharging a prisoner detained for arresting a surety indirectly designated by the Queen to receive protection from arrest).
122. 124. 3 Car., ch. 1 (1627); see also 9 HOLDSWORrH, supra note 84. at 115; WALXER. supra note 84, at 73 (observing that the Petition "cemented in constitutional theory that no man ought to be deprived of his liberty without due course of law as administered by the ordinary tribunals of the land," and designated habeas corpus the "legal instrument" to ensure this "great purpose"). The common law writ also played an important role in placing further limits on executive power. sparking the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640. 16 Car., ch. 10, § 3, which abolished the Star Chamber and other conciliar courts. special command without showing cause. These politico-criminal cases thus underscore the following points: that any detention required cause or justification be provided; that the writ's primary purpose had become the protection of the liberty of individuals; and that the writ played a structural role in limiting executive power.
These cases, however, do not fully capture the scope of review in more ordinary cases. I a 5 Moreover, one need not have been detained by a direct order of the King himself to fall within the meaning of "executive detention." The courts' review of impressment of sailors by the Admiralty reflected a "very notorious instance of judicial authority in matters most nearly concerning the executive."' 126 In these cases, the courts exercised a broad scope of review on habeas. 27 Similarly, commitments by quasi-executive agencies such as the Sewers Commission were subject to searching review on habeas corpus. 1 2 1 While the birth of the administrative state is a phenomenon of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 129 at common law executive detentions-even by proto-agencies such as the Admiralty and the Sewers Commission-triggered a broad scope of review on habeas. 30 
Judgment of an Inferior Court
The distinction at common law between inferior and superior courts was an important one, 13 ' and it significantly influenced the scope of review on habeas. Superior courts were courts of general jurisdiction, whereas inferior courts were limited in jurisdiction by area and power to those matters expressly delegated to them by the document authorizing their establishment 1993) (discussing the history of using prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus, to gain review of inferior officials' acts).
129.
See generally ROBINSON Er AL., supra note 128, at 2-10 (contrasting the growth of administrative agencies in the late 19th century with the small size of the federal government at the founding).
See Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, supra note 56, at 1238 (observing that historically, "[w]hile habeas review of a court judgment was limited to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdictional competency, an attack on an executive order could raise all issues relating to the legality of the detention").
131. At common law, superior courts consisted of the House of Lords, the Chancery, the King's Bench, the Common Pleas, the Exchequer, the Palatine courts, and the Courts of Assize. See 4 STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 2559 (John S. James ed., 5th ed. 1986). Inferior courts included local courts of quasi-criminal jurisdiction, such as the London Lord Mayor's Court and the ancient Borough Court of Record. See id. at 1289-90. Inferior courts also included courts of "special jurisdiction" whose jurisdiction was limited to particular areas or to redress particular injuries, such as the Commissioners of the Sewers.
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *71-85; see also 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note I ll, at 349-50, 576-81 (discussing various courts considered inferior by virtue of their specialized jurisdiction).
or by legal custom. 32 In addition, superior courts were subject only to the control of other courts through appeal, whereas inferior courts were subject to control through the various prerogative writs, such as habeas corpus.'" Unlike judgments of superior courts, which were largely immune from habeas review,'3 judgments of inferior courts were subject to searching review on habeas. In part, this stemmed from the requirement that inferior courts demonstrate jurisdiction with great detail and specificity.' 3 Because a superior court did not have to enumerate or specify the causes on which an imprisonment was based, it provided less opportunity to find fault with the "cause expressed."' ' 36 In contrast, inferior courts had to establish the "full circumstances and grounds upon which an imprisonment is ordered... in both the warrant and the return."' 137 Therefore, superior courts could not only ensure that inferior courts acted within their jurisdiction, but they could also exercise review over nonjurisdictional claims,t"S including errors of law' 39 and, at times, factual findings.'O In fact, great reliance was placed on superior courts, such as the King's Bench, to review the decisions of inferior courts. 4 between "commitments by regular Courts of competent jurisdiction and commitments under a special authority given by Act of Parliament"); cf BAKER. supra note 84. at 117 (observing that judgments by the common law courts "could fairly be treated as final and conclusive" in part because those judgments reflected "tt]he kind of attention now given on appeal").
135. See Peacock v. Bell, 85 Eng. Rep. 84, 87-88 (K.B. 1667) ("INothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which specially appears to be so: and. on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an Inferior Court but that which is so expressly alleged.").
136 control of inferior courts through habeas corpus underscores the writ's structural role and the reasons underpinning a broad scope of review.
An additional, overlapping distinction was made between courts of record and other courts. Courts of record were defined by their ability to fine and imprison for contempt, as well as by the fact that their acts were recorded on parchment for perpetual memory and testimony. 42 While the superior common law courts of Westminster were the primary courts of record, numerous inferior courts, such as justices of the peace,' 43 were also courts of record. 144 In contrast, rival jurisdictions of the common law courts, such as the Admiralty' 45 and the Court of Requests, 146 were not courts of record. In general, courts of record were subject to narrower review on habeas.' 4 Courts of record that were also inferior courts, however, such as the Sewers Commission, were still subject to considerable scrutiny.1 48 Indeed, this suggests that it was precisely these courts' ability to fine and imprison that posed a greater threat to the liberty of the subject, thereby implicating the need for more searching review on habeas corpus.
Absence of Trial by Jury
Another, related factor prompting a broad scope of review on habeas was the absence of a trial by jury. For those facing criminal charges, trial by jury was historically viewed as the preeminent safeguard of liberty in England. 4 142. See 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 111, at 346-48; 1 Jowrrr's DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 133, at 493; see also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 699-700 (1964) (emphasizing that the power to fine and imprison for contempt has historically been an inherent power of all courts of record); 2 THE LAW DICTIONARY Courts (T.E. Tomlins ed., London, Andrew Strahan 1797) (unpaginated dictionary) (stating that courts of record had the power to hold plea, according to the course of the common law, in real, personal, and mixed actions, where the debt or damage amounted to 40 shillings or more). Superior courts were always courts of record. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, as habeas corpus emerged as a means of protecting individual liberty, it became associated with the right to trial by jury.15 The existence of jury trial as the underlying safeguard affected the function of habeas review. Thus, in criminal matters, where the petitioner had a jury trial, habeas tended to play the important but limited function of compelling adherence to pretrial procedure and the right to a speedy jury trial.' Indeed, the rule against controverting the truth of the facts stated in a return to a writ of habeas corpus was predicated on the historic role of juries as factfinders, whose verdicts judges resisted preempting on habeas' 52 In the area of noncriminal commitments and summary criminal convictions, however, the defendant lacked the safeguard of jury trial, and habeas played a different role. In reviewing nonjury proceedings such as bankruptcy, 153 impressment,15 and summary criminal convictions by justices of the peace, 155 courts exercised a broader scope of review.
No Other Available Remedy
Lastly, a petitioner's lack of any other remedy prompted a broad scope of review on habeas. Thus, courts refused to be bound by the four comers of a return in impressment cases, where sailors were forcibly taken abroad and out 151. of the reach of the King's courts.' 56 The threat to liberty did not have to be so drastic as removal from the Kingdom, however. Commitments for contempt-even by superior courts-prompted a broad scope of review on habeas 57 because, absent such review, a prisoner's only recourse was to seek release from the same court that had committed him. Thus, habeas corpus, called by Blackstone "the most celebrated writ in the English Law,"' ' 58 involved broader judicial review where it presented the last resort for an individual facing a loss of liberty.
D. Scope of Habeas Review in Noncriminal Matters and Summary Criminal Convictions
This section demonstrates that the potentially broad scope of habeas review in noncriminal matters, as well as summary criminal convictions, encompassed questions of law, abuses of discretion, and, in some instances, factual findings.
Questions of Law
At least in noncriminal cases and summary convictions by inferior courts, questions of law were reviewable through the common law writ of habeas corpus. This is demonstrated by the comments of the various leading judges on a bill proposed in 1758, the practice of "confessing and avoiding" the return, and the review of legal claims by superior courts in various contexts.
In 1758, the House of Lords rejected a bill that would have both extended the procedural protections of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 to noncriminal cases and allowed prisoners to controvert the truth of the facts stated in returns in noncriminal cases.' 59 It was well established, however, that questions of law were reviewable on habeas. During debate on the 1758 bill, the House of 156. See Goldswain's Case, 96 Eng. Rep. at 712 (declaring that the court "could not willfully shut (its] eyes" to the highly sympathetic facts appearing in the sailor's affidavit though absent from the return); see also Sommersett's Case, 20 Howell's State Trials I, addendum at 1378, 1380 (K.B. 1772) (reprinting a letter from Sir Michael Foster to Justice Baron Parker, dated May 24, 1758, in which Foster calls the alternative remedy, an action for a false return, "a rope thrown out to a drowning man, which cannot reach him, or will not bear his weight"). Notably, it was an impressment case that sparked the proposal of the 1758 bill and thus, indirectly, the judges' discussion about the writ's scope. See INGERSOLL, supra note 150, at 9; SHARPE, supra note 86, at 68.
157. See, e.g., Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1007 (C.P. 1670) (stating that the court's "judgment ought to be grounded upon [its] own inferences and understandings" and not upon those of the court that had committed the juror for contempt); see also Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 1613) (releasing a prisoner committed by the mayor of his town for contempt for his use of "undecent speeches"). Commitments for contempt by the houses of Parliament, however, may have represented an exception to this rule. See, e.g., Earl of Shaftsbury's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 792, 799-800 (K.B. 1677) (holding that while the return would have been "ill and uncertain" if made by "an ordinary Court of Justice," judgments of Parliament were not justiciable). [Vol. 107: 2509
Lords ordered the judges of the common law courts to provide their opinions on the proposed law.' 6 0 Even those judges who denied that the truth of facts in the return could be controverted conceded that habeas review extended to questions of law. 16 ' The opinion of Chief Justice Wilmot leaves no doubt on this issue. Even if, as Wilmot contended, a court was precluded on habeas from inquiring into whether the cause of confinement was "true or ... false," it nonetheless could establish whether the cause was a "good or bad reason."' 162 The writ, Wilmot thus claimed, was not "framed or adapted to litigating facts," but provided "a summary short way of taking the opinion of the Court upon a matter of law."' 163 Moreover, judges were not confined to the four comers of a return in determining whether it was sufficient in point of law to justify a given detention. By "confessing and avoiding" a return to a writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner could introduce facts that did not contradict those in the return but that provided an alternative justification for them.' 6 ' This practice, which has been compared to the use of special verdicts, 16 enabled courts to review questions of law on habeas.' 66 In Gardener's Case,' 67 for example, a prisoner, summarily convicted by a justice of the peace'" for carrying a "hand-gun," confessed and avoided the return to habeas corpus to gain review over a straight question of law: Was a "dagg" a "hand-gun" as defined by the controlling statute? 169 The court ruled against the prisoner on that issuei70 but discharged him on the grounds that, as a sheriff, he was exempt from the act's prohibition against carrying such guns. ] to the truth of facts, the return of the officer is the same as a special verdict .... " (emphasis added)). In Hawkins. the prisoner was convicted for "backbearing and carrying away a deer out of the forest." Id. while the court refused to review the question of whether the prisoner had obtained the deer owner's consent, it nonetheless reviewed the legal issue of what constituted a "taking" in this context. Id.
166. The practice might today be compared to a motion for summary judgment, by which a court may decide a case in which there is no dispute between the parties over any material fact. See FED. R. Civ. P 56.
167 In numerous noncriminal contexts, review on habeas was not limited strictly to whether the committing court had acted within its jurisdiction, but encompassed whether its decision conformed to the governing statute. 73 In reviewing the commitments of contempt by bankruptcy commissioners, for example, common law courts adjudicated claims of statutory construction regarding the meaning, nature, and scope of interrogatories used by the commission. 74 In discharging one prisoner for the commission's misconstruction of the statute granting it power to issue interrogatories, Chief Justice Holt emphasized the principle underpinning judicial review on habeas: "It is very dangerous to let people depart from the words of the Act, where these special authorities are given." 1 75 Similarly, in cases involving malpractice,' 76 husbands and wives,' 77 and local trade ordinances, 178 courts reviewed nonjurisdictional claims of statutory construction. Cases involving the impressment of seamen powerfully demonstrate the reviewability of legal error on habeas. Over the course of four wars fought against France during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 173. See SHARPE, supra note 86, at 39 ("What would suffice as a sufficient return was not defined with precision. Enough had to appear to satisfy the court that the imprisonment was a legal one, and the court did not have to be stymied by technical rules." (emphasis added)).
174. See, e.g., R. v. Nathan, 93 Eng. Rep. 914 (K.B. 1730) (per curiam) (construing a statute to require that interrogatories be exhibited and a deponent be given time to answer); Hollingshead's Case, 91 Eng. Rep. 307 (K.B. 1702) (discharging a prisoner when the bankruptcy commission failed to adhere to the statute); Bracy's Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 547 (K.B. 1701) (holding that the commission's use of the word "embezil" in an interrogatory was not within the meaning and intent of the bankruptcy statute). Indeed, the bankruptcy cases support the notion, suggested in to impress seamen into military service for the Crown."W In numerous instances, habeas enabled common law courts to review petitioners' claims that they were exempt from impressment under a particular act' 8 ' or that a statute granting an exemption was still in force.' 8 2 Although the common law courts supported the power to impress as an executive prerogative, they "strictly limited [its exercise] within the bounds prescribed to it by custom or by statute."'18 3 Likewise, cases reviewing decisions of justices of the peace'gi demonstrate that questions of law were reviewable on habeas. The justices of the peace were given broad power over various criminal matters '8 as well as over the enforcement of an array of economic legislation, making them key players in the administrative operation of the state in medieval and early modem England." 6 The breadth of the power of justices of the peace, however, and their status as inferior courts, made the superior common law courts eager to supervise their activities through habeas corpus, as well as through the writ of certiorari' 87 and mechanisms of informal control.' 88 There are numerous instances of the use of habeas corpus to review orders of the justices of the peace 8 9 as well as those of other quasi-administrative officials. A notable example is the review of decisions by the Sewers Commission, the membership of which traditionally overlapped with that of the justices of the peace, 19° and which had broad power to order surveys and 186. See id. at 139-40 (describing the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace over the system of labor compensation and wage regulation that followed the Black Death of 1348, the maintenance of roads and waterways, and the regulation of trade).
187. See Woolhandler, supra note 116, at 589 n.86 (discussing the frequency %ith ,hich common law courts reviewed decisions by justices of the peace and sewers commissioners). 188 . Informal control over justices of the peace was exercised through advice given by the justices of the assize. Again, the goal was to ensure not merely that justices of the peace acted within their jurisdiction, but also that they interpreted the law correctly. The usual procedure was to adjourn difficult cases until the next assize and to consult with the judge who would "state[I the rules of law applicable." repairs of local infrastructure.' 9 ' In Hetley v. Boyer," 9 the King's Bench discharged on a writ of habeas corpus an individual imprisoned for refusing to release a suit against the Sewers Commission challenging the taxation system it used to finance projects. In invalidating the Commission's taxation system, the King's Bench illustrated that habeas protected the liberty of the subject by ensuring that administrative agencies acted in conformance with existing law.' 93
Abuses of Discretion
The concept of "discretion" was not well developed at common law. The idea that an agency or individual had to act within its delegated authority, however, suggests that abuses of that discretion, like the interpretation of statutes, were reviewable on habeas. In invalidating the taxation scheme established by the sewers commissioners in Hetley v. Boyer, the King's Bench stated that although the statute granted the commissioners discretion in the exercise of their functions, such discretion had to be exercised wisely and according to established legal principles.' 94 Likewise, the courts concluded with respect to impressment that habeas provided review of the Admiralty's alleged abuses of discretion on the ground that the Admiralty's considerable power over such matters should not "be pushed to the extreme."' 95 Similarly, in cases determining whether a husband's custody of his wife was unlawful, the issue often turned on whether a husband abused the discretionary power he had over his wife 196 given her subordinate status as afeme covert. 197. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 94, at *430 (describing how "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing").
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Factual Findings
Notwithstanding the rule against controverting the truth of the return, judges were not entirely precluded from reviewing facts on habeas corpus.'" Five of the nine judges questioned by the House of Lords on the proposed 1758 bill that would have provided for review of facts in noncriminal cases categorically denied that they were bound by the facts set forth in the retum, t 99 as did a sixth judge who was absent .2' Lord Mansfield strongly opposed the bill because he believed the law already permitted what the bill was trying to accomplish. 2 ' Moreover, even Chief Justice Wilmot and the remaining judges who supported the rule against controverting the truth of facts provided in the retum 2 conceded that, in practical terms, questions of fact could be entertained on habeas. 0 3
The main constraint on judicial review of the facts in a return to habeas corpus was the principle that juries must answer to questions of fact and judges to questions of law. 2°4 Judges who refused to review facts emphasized the venerable common law rule that habeas corpus would not supplant trial by jury for the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence in criminal cases. 2 , In criminal matters, therefore, such review was generally limited to questions of pretrial detention. 2°6 In noncriminal matters, however, judges had greater process requirements' ' 2t 4 ignores the writ's long history of use in noncriminal cases to gain judicial review over a range of claims.
A. The Presence of the Five Factors
All five factors discussed above are present in the contemporary immigration context. First, deportation involves fundamental interests "basic to human liberty and happiness, 2 ' 5 and thus implicates the writ's highest function at common law-the safeguarding of personal liberty.
Second, deportation involves executive detention. 222 The acts would thereby denude the common law writ of habeas corpus of its core function as a safeguard of personal liberty and a check on arbitrary executive power. 223 Third, review of deportation orders is akin to the review of decisions of an inferior court at common law. At common law, inferior courts were subject to the strict control of superior courts, which exercised a broad scope of review on habeas. 224 Under the common law definition, both immigration judges and the BIA qualify as inferior courts because their jurisdiction is specialized and limited. 2 In certain respects, immigration tribunals are like the King's conciliar courts, the extensive power of which the common law courts sought to supervise through habeas corpus. 226 General's interpretation of the AEDPA in In m Soriano, any person convicted of a minor cnme many years ago "could no%% be picked up off the streets..., tom from his or her family job or business, and deported" tthout the right to seek a section 212(c) waiver); see also id. at 178 ("[Tihe right to apply for the Isection 212(c)l waiver has been a statutory right which has played a central role in decisions made b) criminally accused lawful permanent residents and other actors in the criminal justice system for decades.").
238. Suspension Clause itself requires that an alien facing deportation have the opportunity to challenge the executive branch's construction of an immigration statute before a federal court. 24 Discretionary decisions play an important role in immigration law, and numerous commentators have stressed the need for greater judicial review of such determinations. 241 This is not simply a matter of public policy, however Fidelity to the common law writ of habeas corpus requires that the exercise of discretion by an immigration judge be reviewable to ensure that this great power over individual liberty is not exercised arbitrarily. Thus, a criminal alien faced with deportation under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA must have the opportunity for review of his claim of statutory eligibility for section 212(c) relief as well as the chance to challenge a denial of a waiver on the merits. Similarly, the IIRIRA cannot be construed as eliminating judicial review over all discretionary decisions, except asylum, 4 2 without running afoul of the Suspension Clause. 243 In addition, the Suspension Clause requires at least some review of factual findings in deportation proceedings. While questions of fact have not arisen in legal challenges to the jurisdictional provisions of the 1996 acts affecting the deportation of criminal aliens, 244 factual determinations have traditionally been important in determinations of deportability based on economic criteria 2 45 or ideology.
2 6 Moreover, the IIRIRA's new "expedited removal" provisions, which now govern the admission of aliens to the United States, 4 7 could also be applied to aliens who allegedly entered the country illegally in the past and have lived continuously in the United States for two years or less. 248 The expedited removal provisions preclude virtually all judicial review 249 and thus could lead to the deportation of aliens based on erroneous factual findings.' 0 Such a result would flout the core purpose of the common law writ of habeas corpus.
C. The Irrelevance of Traditional Reasons for Narrowing Habeas Review
Even if maintaining the common law core of habeas corpus were not, as I argued in Part I, constitutionally compelled, the factors underpinning the recent decisions by Congress25' and the Supreme various provisions of the acts, see, e.g., id. at 35-37 (holding that the IIRIRA's revised definition of "'aggravated felony" did not apply to the petitioner's case), and (4) the interpretation of a preexisting 248. Although the Attorney General has yet to apply the expedited removal provisions to noncitizens residing in the United States, it is within her discretion to do so at anytime. See id. § 1225(bXl)(AXiii)l).
249. See id. § 1225(b)(l)(A)(i) (ordering the removal of suspected illegal aliens seeking to enter the country "without further hearing or review" unless the individual demonstrates to the immigration officer "an intention to apply for asylum ... or a fear of persecution"). The IIRIRA creates a narrow exception for review in habeas corpus proceedings. Such review is limited to determining whether the petitioner is an alien, was ordered removed under the expedited removal provisions, and can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a legal permanent resident, has been admitted as a refugee, or has been granted asylum. See id. § 1252(e)(2)(A)-(C).
250. Cf. Inspection & Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10.312. 10.313-14 (1997) (explaining that the application of the expedited removal provisions to those aliens already in the United States would "involve more complex determinations of fact and will be more difficult to manage" than applying them to those seeking admission at the border); see also Pendleton. supra note 240. at 10 (arguing that the regulations provide no guidance on how noncitizens may show two years of continuous physical presence). branch's interpretation of statutes governing deportation is quite distinct from the "endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude" that is often associated with collateral review of criminal convictions, particularly death penalty cases.
-9 In a fundamental sense, federal habeas review of an administrative deportation order is not collateral at all.
Federalism-based concerns about habeas are likewise irrelevant because deportation in no way implicates the integrity of procedures "employed by a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system."6 Instead, deportation involves the review of actions of another branch of the federal government, a principle well established since Marbury v. Madison. 61 Finally, the process-oriented argument in favor of a narrow understanding of habeas corpus is also inapplicable in the deportation context. That argument is premised on the assumption, itself rooted in the context of collateral review of state convictions, that most petitioners have already received "full and fair" hearings.
2 6 2 The argument quickly falls apart when applied to quasi-judicial proceedings held under the authority of the executive branch. 63 Like review of state convictions, such proceedings implicate the special prominence of federal courts in protecting federal rights.26 In addition, however, they involve the even more basic right to adjudication by a neutral institution. It is one thing to restrict habeas corpus when the individual has the right to direct 259. Bator, supra note 50, at 452. The Supreme Court has created a narrow exception to the principle that successive claims will not be reviewed on habeas absent a showing of cause and prejudice, otherwise known as the "actual innocence" or "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception. See. e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318-23 (1995) (discussing the development and purpose of the exception); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) (describing the "actual innocence" standard for successive habeas petitions as a "narrow" exception to the principle of finality). See generally Friendly. supra note 56, at 160 (proposing an exception to the concept of finality where the petitioner has made a "colorable showing of innocence"). This narrow exception, created in the context of reviewing successive petitions challenging death sentences, is inapplicable to the deportation context where the petitioner has had no prior judicial review whatsoever. appeal before a judicial organ; it is another thing altogether when one may appeal only to an administrative body, such as the BIA, which the Attorney General may overrule. 265 In short, reviewability of deportation orders before an Article I court implicates the "institutional" and "functional" role of habeas 26 0-to ensure the separation of powers and to protect against arbitrary enforcement of the law by the executive.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has challenged long-established assumptions about the writ of habeas corpus. It demonstrates that the common law writ of habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court has consistently described as an authoritative guide to interpreting the Suspension Clause, not only applies to aliens facing deportation, but also supports a broad scope of review. At a time when immigrants in the United States face an angry backlash intent on reducing their access to the federal courts, they may turn to one of the oldest and most exalted forms of action in the common law tradition. While the Court has always paid homage to the Great Writ, it can now fully recognize the common law writ's core value and purpose by declaring unconstitutional the judicial review provisions of the 1996 immigration acts, should they be construed to limit review solely to constitutional claims.
265.
See supra notes 216-222 and accompanying text (discussing the authority of the Attorney General to overrule the BIA).
266. Bator, supra note 50, at 448-49.
